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The modern drone threat has created an awkward military arithmetic problem. Small unmanned aircraft are cheap, abundant and useful for both surveillance and attack, but the missiles traditionally used to destroy them are expensive and limited in number. A defense can therefore shoot down every incoming drone and still lose the larger economic and logistical contest. The Pentagon hopes directed-energy weapons—lasers and high-power microwaves—can reverse that imbalance, but the technology still has to prove that it can work reliably outside controlled tests.

Light, Microwaves and the Cost Exchange

At a June 2026 demonstration at White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico, a U.S. Army prototype based on Epirus’s Leonidas microwave system disabled a swarm of 12 drones. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth also used a high-energy laser system called LOCUST to defeat a drone. The two weapons attack differently. A laser concentrates light on one target long enough to melt plastic or cut metal, whereas a microwave system spreads electromagnetic energy across a wider area and disrupts electronics in multiple aircraft at once.

That distinction matters against swarms. Lasers still have to detect, identify, track and dwell on individual fast-moving targets. The LOCUST-equipped Stryker prototype uses radar to find a drone and an infrared system to identify it before the laser fires. Engineers must also ruggedize delicate optical and power systems so they survive on vehicles rather than remaining laboratory instruments.

Microwaves can spread their effects across a wider patch of sky. Epirus says Leonidas stopped 49 drones with one pulse in an August 2025 test. Its millisecond-long pulses grew out of an observation at Raytheon: powerful shipboard radars could unintentionally interfere with electronics near shore. Epirus turned that unwanted effect into a weapon designed to disable a patch of sky. The strongest performance claims in the article come from company tests, and some drones reportedly approached within roughly a football field before being stopped.

The Hard Part Is Deployment

The Pentagon has long shown interest in directed energy while fielding few operational systems. In August 2025 the Defense Department created Joint Interagency Task Force 401 to speed counterdrone development. The unit selected five U.S. bases—in Arizona, Texas, Washington State, North Dakota and Missouri—for a pilot intended to gather operator feedback, develop training and doctrine, and coordinate domestic use with the Federal Aviation Administration.

Recent incidents show why coordination and identification are as important as raw firepower. In February 2026 Customs and Border Protection used LOCUST near Fort Bliss, Texas, against an object officials considered threatening; it may have been a Mylar party balloon. Because the firing was not coordinated with the FAA, the agency closed airspace around El Paso International Airport. Two weeks later, the military used a laser near Fort Hancock to shoot down another suspected threat. That aircraft belonged to Customs and Border Protection.

These incidents expose a central limitation: a weapon that can destroy a drone is useful only if the surrounding sensor and command system can identify the object and determine whether firing is safe. Domestic deployment also requires coordination with the FAA around civilian aircraft.

An Arms Race, Not a Final Answer

Neither lasers nor microwaves can defend a base or battlefield by themselves. The article argues for layered protection that combines conventional projectiles with directed energy, long-range interception with close-in defenses, and systems that burn, melt or scramble electronics. Different tools cover one another’s weaknesses: a laser offers precision, a microwave can attack a swarm, and kinetic weapons remain available when conditions defeat the newer technologies.

Even a successful layered defense will not end the contest. The United States operates drones as well as countering them, so it must also learn how to protect its own aircraft from weapons like Leonidas and LOCUST. Each countermeasure invites a counter-countermeasure. Directed energy may improve the economics of drone defense, but White Sands is demonstrating the opening of another technological cycle, not its conclusion.