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Economic stagnation is no longer confined to a few obvious laggards. Around 3.3bn people now live in countries where GDP per person grew at no more than half its pace in the previous decade. That is more than two people in five, up from roughly one in six a decade earlier. For more than 730m people, the measure is actually falling.

The slowdown cuts across familiar categories. It includes China and Russia, rich economies such as Germany and Canada, and resource exporters from Brazil to Angola. The causes differ, but the social danger is shared: when people stop expecting to become better off, their attitudes towards work, institutions and politics begin to change.

A widening growth divide

Some economies are still advancing quickly. The average resident of countries that maintained strong growth became 38% richer between 2014 and 2024. India accounts for much of that success, as falling birth rates and economic catch-up lifted incomes for its 1.5bn people. America has also continued to outperform most other rich countries.

Elsewhere, the number of economies with weak or nonexistent growth in GDP per person rose from 68 to 80 over the decade. In wealthy countries, poor productivity growth is often compounded by rapid population increases. Germany’s real income per person grew by only 0.6% a year from 2014 to 2024, down from 1.5% in the previous decade. In Canada, population growth outpaced output and unemployment rose, largely because the labour force expanded faster than the economy could create jobs.

Many developing countries are still suffering from the end of the commodity boom in 2014. The average Latin American is barely richer than a decade ago. South of the Sahel, income per person has fallen by 3.4%, while Angola’s has dropped by a quarter. Among the original BRIC economies, only India escaped the slowdown: China’s per-person growth halved, and Russia’s improvement also fell to less than half its earlier rate despite a shrinking population.

These different stories produce the same fiscal squeeze. Sluggish firms generate less profit and tax revenue, while governments must spread limited budgets across populations that may still be growing. Public services deteriorate just as households feel that the economic bargain has stopped working.

When progress stops feeling normal

For decades, rising living standards supported an assumption that children would live better than their parents. As that confidence fades, nostalgia and disengagement take its place. A 2025 survey of 20,000 Europeans found that at least two-fifths believed their generation was economically disadvantaged. Young adults were nearly as susceptible to this sense of loss as people in their 50s.

The pattern is visible in more authoritarian countries too. A majority of younger Chinese surveyed by a consultancy worried that they would not achieve a better life, in sharp contrast with the optimism recorded among a slightly older cohort a decade earlier. Another long-running survey found that the share of Chinese people who believed hard work was always rewarded fell from 62% in 2014 to 28% in 2023. With urban youth unemployment at 18%, even university education no longer offers reassurance: roughly two-fifths of unemployed Chinese aged 23 to 28 have degrees.

Russia shows a similar withdrawal from public life. In one poll, only 5% of young adults said they would consider government work despite strong national identification. The problem is not merely disappointment with current conditions. It is a loss of faith that established institutions provide a credible route to advancement.

The political feedback loop

Stagnation can make politics more volatile. Western Europeans experiencing what researchers call nostalgic deprivation were 55 percentage points more likely to support populist parties than those who did not feel similarly deprived. Voters may swing between left and right, repeatedly punishing incumbents for living standards that fail to improve.

That reaction can become self-reinforcing. Frequent political reversals make consistent economic policy harder, weakening investment and growth; continued stagnation then intensifies anger at whoever governs. The article’s warning is therefore broader than a disappointing GDP figure. A world in which billions no longer experience material progress risks a gradual unravelling of ambition, social trust and political stability.