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Two cryptocurrency billionaires have offered Reform UK an extraordinary political windfall: Ben Delo and Christopher Harborne each promised the party £36m. Their backgrounds and Reform’s own conduct make suspicion understandable. Delo was convicted in America of failing to implement anti-money-laundering controls before receiving a presidential pardon, while Reform recently suspended two senior figures who appeared to encourage a prospective donor to evade the rules.

The article nevertheless argues that blocking the donations, especially through retroactive legislation, would be a mistake. The real problem is not that too much money enters British politics, but that too little does. Legal donations should face scrutiny and existing rules should be enforced, yet Britain would damage both effective government and the rule of law by inventing new restrictions to stop an unpopular party from using money it lawfully received.

Money is not the same as victory

Critics combine three objections: Reform may break campaign-finance rules, its new resources may give it an unfair advantage and large donations may corrupt politics. The first concern is credible and should be investigated. But the other two do not necessarily follow.

British elections already impose tight limits on campaign spending. Beyond a certain point, additional cash cannot simply be converted into more votes. Reform may also discover that a sudden fortune creates its own problems. The party contains factions that are already fighting, and competition over how to allocate the money could intensify those divisions. A large bank balance may improve its organisation without making electoral success inevitable.

This distinction matters because rules against foreign or concealed donations should be enforced without treating every legal contribution as improper. If Parliament responds to one controversial recipient by changing the law after the fact, it would turn election regulation into a weapon for established parties. That would reinforce Reform’s claim that the political system is rigged against insurgents and could ultimately strengthen Nigel Farage rather than constrain him.

A politics run on a shoestring

The deeper case for allowing the money is that Britain’s political parties are chronically underfunded. The article notes that the Donkey Sanctuary and the Royal Opera House each received more money in the previous year than every major British party combined. Reform’s entire £72m pledge was smaller than the amount spent on a single Republican Senate primary in Texas.

That scarcity is not a sign of healthy frugality. A party that wins a general election takes responsibility for more than £1.3trn in public spending, yet opposition politicians often prepare for government with only two or three staff members. Reform plans to use part of its donation to double its policy team to 20 researchers. Even that modest capacity would help it turn slogans into proposals that could be tested before an election.

Well-funded parties can employ policy specialists and lawyers, scrutinise legislation and prepare ministers for office. Starving them of legal funding does not eliminate the influence of money; it leaves politics more dependent on a narrow group of donors, volunteers and insiders. The article contends that Britain would be better served by a broader culture of public-spirited giving, including from people who dislike the party that first benefits from it.

Compete instead of banning

British cynicism treats political donations as inherently suspect: if someone gives money, voters assume the donor must expect a corrupt return. That attitude can become self-fulfilling. If contributing to a party is seen as disreputable, respectable donors stay away and the remaining pool becomes more dubious.

The stronger response to Reform’s windfall is therefore political competition. Opponents should investigate genuine violations, defend neutral rules and raise money for the parties they want to win. They should not reach for a retrospective ban merely because an adversary has attracted wealthy backers.

The article’s conclusion is deliberately uncomfortable. Reform and its donors need not be admirable for their legal participation to benefit democracy. More money can produce better policy preparation, while spending caps prevent it from buying unlimited influence. Britain should police misconduct firmly, but it should also make political giving normal enough that parties can afford to govern competently. Those who fear Reform should answer it with stronger institutions, better arguments and their own chequebooks.