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South Africa’s most dangerous criminal networks no longer operate only outside the state. They have pushed into legal industries, public contracts, police forces and political organizations, turning ordinary corruption into a threat to democratic government. The Economist argues that the country can still reverse this process, but only if it treats organised crime as a political system rather than a collection of street-level offences.

President Cyril Ramaphosa has called organised crime the country’s most immediate threat, while business leaders reportedly rank it above even electricity shortages. A recent public inquiry exposed extensive collusion among gangs, officials and senior police. One international estimate places South Africa among the countries most vulnerable to mafia influence, behind only a handful of states with even weaker institutions.

Crime is becoming an alternative system of power

South Africa has long struggled with violent crime and trafficking in drugs, people and endangered wildlife. The newer danger is that criminal methods are spreading into activities that look like normal commerce. Most cigarettes sold in the country are illicit, according to the article, while large quantities of alcohol and fuel are also bootlegged. Illegal mining alone reduced recorded GDP by an estimated 0.8% in 2024.

Extortion groups have also learned to profit from the threat of disruption. They demand payment not to sabotage construction sites, burn buses or kill teachers. More seriously, gangs have infiltrated the institutions meant to stop them. Politicians can steer public contracts toward criminal allies, take kickbacks and borrow gang muscle to settle political disputes. Once that relationship takes hold, crime is no longer merely exploiting weak government; it is helping to govern.

The country still has important defences. Its courts remain independent, civil society and the press are active, and voters are deeply frustrated by crime. Ramaphosa came to power promising to clean up after Jacob Zuma’s presidency and has reason to want a reforming legacy. The recent removal of the police minister, the national police leadership and the heads of two elite crime units suggests that corrupt structures are not untouchable.

Reform must survive the politicians

The Economist proposes attacking criminal organizations from the top. Tainted prosecutors and senior police officers should be removed, while investigators target syndicate leaders and follow the money. Officials in sensitive positions should disclose their finances or resign. Cities with a record of cleaner government, such as Cape Town, should receive more policing authority, and prosecutors should draw on financial and technical expertise from the private sector.

Past examples show both what can work and why reform is fragile. South Africa’s tax authority recovered after years of institutional decay. The Scorpions, an earlier elite investigative unit, successfully pursued syndicate leaders and senior officials, but was abolished after investigating Zuma and his allies. A new gang-busting agency would therefore need constitutional protection strong enough to prevent a future government from closing it when investigations become politically inconvenient.

Foreign examples reinforce the same lesson. Nuevo Leon in Mexico replaced a police force infiltrated by drug gangs with a new institution built from scratch. Brazil’s “Hidden Carbon” operation attacked the financial networks behind organized crime. By contrast, Guatemala’s popular UN-backed anti-corruption body was shut down by a president it had investigated. Technical competence matters, but durable independence matters more.

The central obstacle sits inside politics, including Ramaphosa’s own African National Congress. The article doubts that he will confront powerful compromised figures without pressure from business leaders and coalition partners. Delay carries a democratic risk: nearly three-quarters of South Africans say they would support a strongman who could provide jobs and reduce crime. A leader in the style of El Salvador’s Nayib Bukele might promise order while sweeping away due process.

That is the choice at the heart of the article. South Africa can fight mafias through independent courts, accountable police and constitutionally protected investigators, or it can let public fear create an appetite for authoritarian shortcuts. Defeating organised crime is essential, but preserving the rule of law is part of the victory, not an obstacle to it.