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Narendra Modi’s relentless travel is more than personal diplomacy. It reflects a wider effort by Asia’s middle powers to protect themselves against two uncomfortable realities: China’s economic and military weight, and an America that many governments now regard as less dependable. India is not choosing a new bloc. It is helping build a network of practical partnerships that can give countries more room to manoeuvre between the superpowers.

An insurance policy for a harsher Asia

Modi recently completed his 100th foreign trip since becoming prime minister in 2014. After visiting France and Slovakia, he travelled to the Seychelles, hosted Japan’s prime minister and continued to Indonesia, Australia and New Zealand. The itinerary produced agreements on defence, maritime security, semiconductors and rare earths. Taken together, they show Asian governments trying to reduce their dependence on any single great power.

Indian foreign-policy analyst C. Raja Mohan calls the strategy “G minus 2”. The phrase is a response to talk of a possible American-Chinese “G2” arrangement in which the two superpowers would set the terms for everyone else. Asia’s middle powers cannot turn their backs on America, nor can they contain China by themselves. Their answer is to cooperate with one another, even when old disputes and political differences have previously kept them apart.

The change in Washington’s posture has made that effort more urgent. Although India escaped the punitive tariffs imposed by Donald Trump, officials see little prospect of repairing the broader relationship while he remains in office. A seemingly minor decision in June reinforced the anxiety: America renamed its Indo-Pacific Command the Pacific Command. The word “Indo” had been added in 2018 to signal India’s importance and the maritime role of the Quad, which also includes Australia and Japan. Removing it was interpreted in Delhi as both a snub and evidence of American retreat.

Partnerships become more concrete

The most notable progress is between India and Australia. Their ties were long limited by Australia’s concerns about nuclear proliferation and Kashmir, and by India’s suspicion of Western alliances. Those objections have receded. Australia agreed to supply India with uranium for nuclear energy, while the two countries promised to coordinate on maritime security - language India had previously resisted.

Cooperation with Japan is also moving beyond infrastructure into defence and technology. The countries have agreed to produce military equipment together for the first time, beginning modestly with radio antennae. New Zealand and India are planning more naval exercises and information-sharing. In Indonesia, Modi signed a deal to supply the Indian-made BrahMos missile system. Each agreement is limited, but collectively they create useful links in defence production, energy and regional security.

This is not yet an Asian alliance. Governments still disagree over how to manage Trump and how firmly to resist China. Shared concern does not automatically produce deep trust, and the region’s middle powers remain more divided than their European counterparts. Yet they are also more directly exposed to shifts in the balance between Washington and Beijing.

That combination explains Modi’s pace. India’s diplomacy is designed less to replace one dominant partner than to accumulate alternatives. The deals may look piecemeal, but that is the point: a web of narrower relationships can provide resilience when neither superpower offers a comfortable or reliable strategic home.