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Donald Trump’s use of the Department of Justice to pursue enemies is the most visible sign of its politicization. The deeper danger, the article argues, is quieter: the department is losing experienced staff, abandoning important work, overwhelming itself with presidential obsessions and forfeiting the trust of judges. Those changes could weaken American law enforcement long after Trump leaves office.

From guardian of the law to presidential instrument

The Justice Department has two roles that can pull in different directions. It represents the federal government, but since Watergate it has also been expected to defend the rule of law with some independence from the White House. Trump rejects that distinction. By choosing Todd Blanche, his personal lawyer and the acting attorney-general, to lead the department permanently, he is treating it as an extension of the presidency.

The shift is visible in what the department chooses to investigate. Health-care fraud is being pursued especially aggressively in Democratic-led states such as California and Minnesota, where cases can also damage governors Gavin Newsom and Tim Walz. Election fraud consumes growing resources despite the lack of evidence that it is a significant problem. The FBI seized records from Georgia’s most populous county related to the 2020 election and assigned about 260 analysts to review them. Even if the operation finds nothing, it can still undermine public confidence in elections.

At the same time, areas of clear public importance are being neglected. Roughly a quarter of the department’s lawyers have left. Units focused on cryptocurrency fraud and public corruption have withered, financial-fraud indictments from headquarters and Manhattan are 30% below their ten-year average, and about 300 FBI agents with national-security expertise have departed. Their experience in counterterrorism and cyber-warfare will be difficult to replace.

A department losing capacity and credibility

Trump has also redirected staff toward immigration enforcement. More than 61,000 petitions from detained immigrants have burdened courts, prompting prosecutors to move lawyers out of criminal divisions. By September, about one-fifth of FBI agents had been diverted to immigration work. Changing enforcement priorities is a president’s legitimate prerogative; exhausting the institution in service of politically useful goals is something else.

The resulting disorder is showing up in court. During Trump’s first 14 months, the department gave judges inaccurate information nearly 100 times. Some errors may reflect depleted staff and rushed work rather than deliberate deception, but that distinction becomes less meaningful once courts no longer assume that government lawyers are reliable. A justice system depends not only on formal authority but also on institutional credibility.

The risks are growing as presidential control expands elsewhere. In Trump v Slaughter, the Supreme Court allowed the president to dismiss the leaders of semi-independent agencies such as the Federal Trade Commission and Securities and Exchange Commission. A compliant Justice Department could therefore work with those agencies in coordinated campaigns against disfavored companies, combining antitrust, consumer-protection and disclosure investigations into a powerful instrument of pressure.

Courts can restrain, but not easily repair

Blanche’s appointment is unlikely to change direction. He has helped advance a system that prosecutes Trump’s adversaries and protects his allies, and the department has threatened state election officials with criminal charges over voter rolls. The Senate can reject his nomination, but Trump could keep him as acting attorney-general for months or replace him with someone equally pliable.

For now, federal courts remain the strongest check. Judges have blocked a demand for the names of Georgia election workers and overturned a settlement that would have shielded Trump and his family from tax audits. Yet judicial resistance can stop particular abuses without rebuilding the department’s staff, expertise or professional norms.

That is the article’s bleakest conclusion. A future president might try to restore independence, but removing Trump’s partisan appointees would be portrayed as another political purge. If each change of administration brings mass dismissals and retaliation, skilled lawyers committed to neutral enforcement will avoid public service. Reconstructing the modern Justice Department after Watergate required bipartisan restraint and statesmanship. Restoring it after repeated cycles of politicization may prove harder still.